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PAGING THE ORACLE: INTERPRETATION,
IDENTITY AND PERFORMANCE IN
HERODOTUS’ HISTORY
By ELTON BARKER
There is only one force of history that can break the reign of hatred and resentment,
and expose the pretensions of tyrants, and reward the hopes of the decent and toler-
ant, and that is the force of human freedom. . . . History has an ebb and flow of justice,
but history also has a visible direction, set by liberty and the Author of Liberty.1
45 minutes from attack.2
In his early Byzantine Chronicle, Johannes Malalas fills out the figure
of Cyrus, Croesus’ silent antagonist in Herodotus. While Croesus is
consulting the Delphic oracle, Cyrus enjoys a quite different divine
audience:
 δ πσοζυθΚ ∆αξιµ ετµρε πσΚ υξ βατιµα Πεστξ Λupsilontildeσοξ· λα µηει αupsilonlenisυ!
ΛupsilontildeσοΚ· επ νοι ε ξιλ Λσο$τοξ υξ βατιµα Μφδξ;
And the prophet Daniel came to the King of the Persians, Cyrus. And Cyrus says to
him: ‘Tell me, am I going to conquer Croesus King of the Lydians?’3
When the Christian prophet hesitates, Cyrus throws him to the lions –
only swiftly to repent. Daniel returns the favour by confirming that
Cyrus will defeat Croesus because God breaks the ‘might of kings’.4
Malalas’ version of divine counselling clearly draws on Christian
moralizing traditions; but it also flags up the confrontation between
the powerful king and the word of god in Herodotus’ narrativisation
of Croesus’ downfall. At the same time, however, it offers a radically
different interpretative model. Here we don’t just have a Croesus
consulting the oracle and failing to comprehend it; Cyrus is told
what will happen – and why – by the prophet Daniel! From Croesus
(mis)reading the oracle to Cyrus receiving instruction from God,
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1 Remarks by US President, George W. Bush, at his second inauguration address (Source:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120–1.html).
2 London Evening Standard, headline, 24/09/2002. In what follows any resemblance to actual
events (past or present) or real persons (living or dead) is not entirely coincidental.
3 Chronicle 6.9 (Dind. 155/157.22–3). All translations are mine.
4 τγupsilongraveξ βατιµψξ διασσωψ: Chronicle 6.9 (Dind. 155/157.33) – as God himself puts it.
narrative dynamics have undergone a fundamental shift. It’s now the
gospel . . .
Scholarship on Croesus testing Delphi, and on oracles more gener-
ally, has tended to focus on reconstructing the ‘original’ oracular texts
and assessing Herodotus’ role as a historian (in the modern sense of
the word) in the light of how accurate his record is deemed to be.5
Notwithstanding the fact that such positivist approaches to historical
writing have been challenged6 and that recent studies have been far
more nuanced,7 the oracles themselves remain the focus of investiga-
tion. In tracing their ‘changing representations’ I want to look
exclusively at how they function within Herodotus’ narrative.
In this paper I examine how Herodotus uses the oracle: first, to
explore the limits of power as Croesus attempts to enlist divine sanc-
tion for his expansionist project; second, to complicate a reading of
his own authority in the way oracles are embedded in the narrative;
third, to construct a sense of Greek identity through the performance
of oracular interpretation. But before developing these points further
– since whoever consults the oracle risks reading into it their own
expectations – let me unpack my baggage upfront and display the
tools of my enquiry.
Four issues underpin my approach. The first relates to the notor-
ious ambiguity of the oracle, aptly summed up by Heraclitus: ‘The
Lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither says nor conceals: he indi-
cates.’8 Modern commentators have reframed this fundamental notion
in terms of culture; for example, Tom Harrison (op. cit., p. 149):
The Ethiopians, Herodotus reports, obey their oracle to the letter and march wher-
ever and whenever their god tells (2.29.7). How, we may wonder again, could any
system of belief so inflexible be sustained? Greek oracles and prophecies, by contrast,
are frequently equivocal – and so require interpretation.
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5 The standard works on the Delphic oracle have establishing authenticity as their aim:
H. W. Parke and D. E. W. Wormell, The Delphic Oracle (Oxford, 1956); R. Crahay, La littérature
oraculaire chez Hérodote (Paris, 1956); J. Fontenrose, The Delphic Oracle: Its Responses and Opera-
tions with a Catalogue of Responses (Berkeley, 1978).
6 ‘We get more out of tracing changing representations than from chasing the uncatchable
shadows of a real, one-time’ oracle – to paraphrase Keith Hopkins, A World Full of Gods: Pagans,
Jews and Christians in the Roman Empire (London, 1999), 323–4, on Jesus.
7 L. Maurizio, ‘Delphic Oracles as Oral Performance: Authenticity and Historical Evidence’,
CA 16 (1997), 308–34, identifies the role of the audience in authorizing oracles; T. E. H.
Harrison, Divinity and History: The Religion of Herodotus (Oxford, 2000) explores the mechan-
isms by which belief was sustained and reinforced; J. C. Kindt, The Delphic Oracle: A Poetics of
Futures Past between History, Literature, and Religion (Cambridge PhD thesis, 2003) proposes a
narratological approach that understands the use of obscure language as a strategy that ‘draws
the reader into the search for meaning in the story’ (64). Her book is forthcoming.
8  4ξαω οupsilontildeasper υ ναξυε$,ξ -τυι υ -ξ ∆εµζο$Κ οupsilonlenisacuteυε µηει οupsilonlenisacuteυε λσupsilonacuteπυει 2µµ1 τθνα0ξει (22 B
93 DK).
Harrison implies a difference in the nature and reception of oracles:
Ethiopian oracles are didactic and are followed to the letter; Greek
oracles are ambiguous and demand interpretation. Robert Parker
expresses that relationship slightly differently. He writes: ‘arguments
about the interpretation of particular oracles are so common as to
suggest that they are not a by-product but an essential part of the
institution’s working’.9 My first point, then, is to relate Greek oracular
ambiguity and polysemy to an institutional context of reception. In
turn, that institutional context may best be understood in terms of the
agonistic culture of ancient Greece, as implied by Giovanni Manetti’s
description of the divine sign as a ‘mechanism which provokes inter-
pretations, interpretations which must be tested by means of a
confrontation between opposing speeches’.10 But here a note of
caution should be sounded: Harrison speculates that, while misinter-
pretation is the rule not the exception in Herodotus, ‘[i]t may well,
however, have been the case in practice that the majority of oracles
were relatively unequivocal responses to clear questions.’11 That is to
say, Herodotus is no passive conduit for oracular practice, but – along
with Heraclitus – a key figure in constructing the tradition of Delphi’s
oracular ambiguity. Regardless of claims of ‘historicity’ or authen-
ticity, the Delphic oracle in Herodotus is represented as an institution
that stimulates argument over interpretation.
Leaving aside Herodotus’ role in this construction of Delphi for the
time being, I want to return to the different ways in which oracles are
received. Lisa Maurizio has similarly distinguished between Greek
and Persian approaches to oracular interpretation, but with a different
emphasis:
Noisy Greek debate about the meaning of an oracle, such as we find in the story of
the wooden wall oracle, is replaced by the Persians’ stony silence when asked by
Mardonius if they know of any relevant oracles. Afraid to risk Mardonius’ displeasure,
they do not reveal the oracular knowledge, which, Herodotus implies, could have
saved them.12
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9 R. Parker, ‘Greek States and Greek Oracles’, in P. A. Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (eds.),
Crux: Essays Presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix (London, 1985), 298–326 (quotation from
301–2).
10 G. Manetti, Theories of the Sign in Classical Antiquity (Indianapolis, 1993), 34. The orac-
ular message as open to competing interpretations: N. Thompson, Herodotus and the Origins of
the Political Community: Arion’s Leap (New Haven, 1996), 101, 104.
11 Harrison (n. 7), 156 (his italics).
12 Maurizio (n. 7), 328 n. 67. Cf. H. Klees, Die Eigenart des griechischen Glaubens an Orakel
und Seher (Stuttgart, 1965).
Herodotus’ correction of Mardonius, according to Maurizio, ‘under-
scores the failures of a political system in which only one man’s
perspective is allowed to be heard’13 – which brings me to the second
subject that interests me here: power. A striking manifestation of the
despot’s power is the control he tries to exert over the process of signi-
fication. For example, Deborah Steiner describes how Darius, in a
gesture symbolic of his majesty, literally writes himself on to and all
over the landscapes he conquers: ‘Darius’s acquisition of kingship and
subsequent empire building are . . . charted through a number of
inscribed stone columns and statues that proclaim his power and
testify to his expanding domain.’14 Given the Eastern despot’s drive to
author the semiotic world, Herodotus’ oracle represents a key site of
confrontation and struggle – as Malalas himself exploits – between
kingly power and the polysemic divine word, a locus where ‘truth
speaks to power’.15
Many scholars have responded to that power struggle by arguing
that the despot fails to grasp the full significance of the oracular
message and, following on from this, that this shows the superiority of
the Greek system(s) of government, in which deliberation is carried
out by, and on behalf of, the citizen body as a whole.16 As Paul
Cartledge has observed: ‘Time and again, implicitly and explicitly,
Herodotus draws a polar contrast between what we might call Greek
Republican freedom and self-government and Persian oriental despo-
tism.’17 The third issue then is one of identity, a question of Greek and
barbarian, of us versus them: getting the oracle right depends on who
you are and where you’re from.
Not all scholars have accepted the strict separation of self from
other, however. For one thing, as Christopher Pelling has shown in his
critique of Hartog, there are a number of examples where the self
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13 Maurizio (n. 7), 328 n. 67.
14 D. T. Steiner, The Tyrant’s Writ: Myths and Images of Writing in Ancient Greece (Princeton,
1994), 133.
15 E. J. M. Greenwood and P. A. Cartledge, ‘Herodotus as a Critic: Truth, Fiction, Polarity’,
in E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. de Jong and H. van Wees (eds.), Brill’s Companion to Herodotus (Leiden,
2002), 351–71 (quotation from 351).
16 Dominant powers undermined: P. Payen, Les îles nomades: conquérir et résister dans l’Enquête
d’Hérodote (Paris, 1997); Croesus’ downfall connected to oracles: H. I. Flower, ‘Herodotus and
Delphic Traditions about Croesus’, in M. A. Flower and M. Toher (eds.), Georgica: Greek Studies
in Honour of George Cawkwell. BICS 58 (London, 1991), 57–77 (62).
17 P. A. Cartledge, The Greeks: A Portrait of Self and Others (Oxford, 20022), 76. Constructing
the Other: E. Hall, Inventing the Barbarian (Oxford, 1989). Greeks versus barbarians in
Herodotus: F. Hartog, The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of
History (Berkeley, 1988 [1980]); D. Lateiner, The Historical Method of Herodotus (Toronto, 1989),
163–86.
appears reflected in the other and vice versa.18 Moreover, Herodotus
himself is a figure on the margins. He belongs to the avant-garde of
the intellectual revolution convulsing the fifth-century Greek world.19
As a native of Halicarnassus he stands on the front-line of the Greek
engagement with the Other, geographically and culturally between
east and west; part of what is being fought over in the history he
narrates.20
With this warning against the strict separation of self and other in
mind, the fourth, and final, issue I want to consider here is the posi-
tion of Herodotus as a writer of prose. Much has been written about
the agonistic milieu in which Herodotus was engaged.21 Building on
this work Simon Goldhill, in his study of The Invention of Prose, identi-
fies Herodotus’ epic-length prose narrative as a radical departure from
anything that had gone before it.22 By virtue of writing down his
account in prose, Herodotus stands, therefore, on the margins in
another way: as a writer in a culture that privileged the public spoken
word, as a practitioner of prose in a tradition that acclaimed the poet’s
voice.23 In fact, we might say that no institutional context exists for what
he is doing or – equally as importantly – for how that work is to be
received; ‘his narrative,’ as Leslie Kurke has put it, ‘is disembedded
from a specific ritual or religious performance context.’24 Given the
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18 C. B. R. Pelling, ‘East is East and West is West – Or Are They? National Stereotypes in
Herodotus’, Histos (1997). For the non-stereotyping of tyrants: V. J. Gray, ‘Herodotus and
Images of Tyranny: The Tyrants of Corinth’, AJP 117 (1996), 361–89. L. Kurke, Coins, Bodies,
Games, and Gold: The Politics of Meaning in Archaic Greece (Princeton, 1999) sees a ‘struggle over
the construction of tyrannic power’ being played out in Herodotus’ narrative (67).
19 R. Thomas, Herodotus in Context: Ethnography, Science and the Art of Persuasion
(Cambridge, 2000). Cf. G. E. R. Lloyd, The Revolutions of Wisdom: Studies in the Claims and Prac-
tice of Ancient Greek Science (Berkeley, 1987).
20 S. D. Goldhill, The Invention of Prose: Greece & Rome New Surveys in the Classics no. 32
(Oxford, 2002), 11.
21 Contest of voices: Greenwood and Cartledge (n. 15), 352; cf. S. D. Goldhill, The Poet’s
Voice (Cambridge, 1991), 167–76. Agonistic milieu: Thomas (n. 19), 249–69; M. A. Flower and
J. Marincola, Herodotus: Histories Book IX (Cambridge, 2002), 4.
22 Herodotus the radical: Lateiner (n. 17), 13–51; R. L. Fowler, ‘Herodotus and his
Contemporaries’, JHS 116 (1996), 62–87; D. Boedeker, ‘Herodotus’ Genre(s)’, in M. Depew
and D. Obbink (eds.), Matrices of Genre: Authors, Canons, and Society (Harvard, 2000), 97–114.
23 Herodotus on the cusp between orality and literacy: L. Kurke, ‘Charting the Poles of
History: Herodotus and Thoukydides’, in O. Taplin (ed.), Literature in the Greek World (Oxford,
2001), 115–37 (131); ‘Herodotus’ intrusive narrator must be seen in the context of late-fifth-
century oral performance culture’: J. Marincola, Greek Historians: Greece & Rome New Surveys in
the Classics no. 31 (Oxford, 2001), 42. For a useful warning against overplaying Herodotus’ oral
style: R. Thomas, Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece (Cambridge, 1992), 102–4.
24 Kurke (n. 23), 122. Kurke sees the lack of performance context as positively freeing
Herodotus ‘from the pressure to produce simply a celebratory narrative that serves the interests
of any single community – in contrast to historical elegy or the tales of logioi and oral remem-
brancers’. Hugely influential – for this paper too – is the suggestion by Greg Nagy, who posits
that ‘the very concept of genre becomes necessary only when the occasion for a given speech-act,
absence of an institutional context for the production and reception
of an epic work of written prose, how does Herodotus get his voice
heard? In short, what does authority mean to a writer of prose in a
culture where literature was publicly performed – if not composed –
and sanctioned?25
It is anything but an innocent question. Steiner further argues that:
To write, in the landscape of Herodotus and other contemporary authors, is to enter
the world of the tyrant, to set oneself on the side of the autocrat, the oppressor, the
enslaver.26
Steiner here is thinking of Eastern kings and certain Greek tyrants,
and limits her criticism of writing to that of the historical agents. But
her label the ‘landscape of Herodotus’ suggestively brings to mind the
situation of the author himself. Herodotus, in his practice of observing
and recording, sets himself in danger of treading a similar path to the
despot, who maps out the world under his possession.27 Here is the
crux of the matter. Most critics readily hold the view that Herodotus
is a keen supporter of freedom.28 Yet, the written text lacks the
communal sanction public poetry would enjoy. How, then, does
Herodotus’ championing of freedom square with his authoring of an
account, in which he stresses his individual effort in compiling,
recording and assessing his material? Or, to put it in Steiner’s terms,
how does he avoid adopting the position of tyrant over his wor(l)d?29
Whereas – it is said – the cultures of the East tend towards accepting
dominance with resigned passivity,30 authority in the Greek world of
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that is for a poem or song, is lost’ (Pindar’s Homer: The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past [Baltimore,
1990], 362 n. 127, his italics).
25 ‘[A]s a freelance inquirer, Herodotus faced countless pressures. He had to establish
authority for himself and, in many respects, to create the criteria according to which he wanted his
work to be judged’: Greenwood and Cartledge (n. 15), 352 (my italics).
26 Steiner (n. 14), 128.
27 Steiner (n. 14), 142. M. R. Christ, ‘Herodotean Kings and Historic Inquiry’, CA 13
(1994), 167–202, and Thompson (n. 10), 87f., both discuss Herodotus’ difference from the
despot in the nature of his enquiry.
28 Nicely summed up by Boedeker (n. 22), 114: ‘Herodotus’ new genre reflects in essential
ways the politics he explicitly admires . . . [H]is account – like the freedom of speech (τθηοσ0α)
that he says made Athens successful (5.78) – gives many different voices their say, even while showing
that not all speak with equal veracity and wisdom.’
29 Steiner herself does not consider what implications – if any – there may be for our under-
standing of Herodotus as an author.
30 Thompson (n. 10), 84, characterizes the Persians as committed to the truth, and passive,
in contrast to the suspicious and critical Herodotus. The Herodotean disclaimer is meant as a
reminder that this opposition is a construct of the Greek imagination – and of Western critics
ever since: E. Said, Orientalism (London, 1978).
Herodotus’ day is a matter of resistance, debate and negotiation.31
What kind of authority does Herodotus then have, and what might
that mean for the author who records and celebrates Greek freedom
from foreign oppression?
We are now in a position to return to our original question – how
do the oracles function within Herodotus’ narrative? – with a sharper
focus to our enquiry: that is to say, how do the oracles work in relation
to the problem of Herodotus authorizing his written voice? The topic
of Herodotus’ authority has received increasing critical attention over
the past decades,32 slowly teasing out the role of the reader.33 One
popular approach has been to analyse Herodotus’ compositional tech-
nique and, in particular, the way in which he sets rival accounts
alongside each other glossed by varying degrees of authorial scepti-
cism.34 Critics have been tempted to read Herodotus’ juxtaposition of
competing voices as a form of ‘dialogism’, presenting his text to his
reader as something akin to an ‘open agora of logoi’.35 But the open
texture of the narrative also works to lure in the reader, whereby ‘even
the explicit denial of evaluation becomes part of the rhetoric of autho-
rization’.36 Picking up on this point, I want to propose an alternative
strategy with which Herodotus gets his voice heard – without
adopting the tone of the tyrant; that is, by re-presenting oracular
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31 ‘In the world of the city-state, especially in the developed democracies, citizens had long
been used to hearing alternative points of view expressed, and to adjudicating between them
when they cast their votes in the law-courts and assemblies . . . The language of Herodotus
shows him to be a man of his day’: Fowler (n. 22), 79, 80.
32 The question of authority: C. Dewald, ‘Narrative Surface and Authorial Voice in
Herodotus’ Histories’, Arethusa 20 (1987), 147–70; J. Marincola, ‘Herodotean Narrative and
Narrator’s Presence’, Arethusa 20 (1987), 121–37; C. Darbo-Peschanski, Le Discours du
particulier: Essai sur l’enquête hérodotéenne (Paris, 1987), 164–89.
33 ‘[T]he syntax of Herodotus’ first clause is predicated on the connection made between
reader and text in the absence of the author’: Kurke (n. 23), 120. Cf. E. J. Bakker, ‘The Making
of History: Herodotus’ Historiês Apodexis’, in E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. de Jong and H. Van Wees (eds.),
Brill’s Companion to Herodotus (Leiden, 2002), 3–32.
34 On Herodotus’ handling of his logoi: C. Dewald, ‘“I didn’t give my own genealogy”:
Herodotus and the Authorial Persona’, in E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. de Jong and H. van Wees (eds.),
Brill’s Companion to Herodotus (Leiden, 2002), 267–89. D. Chamberlain, ‘“We the Others”:
Interpretative Community and Plural Voice in Herodotus’, CA 20 (2001), 5–34, distinguishes
between Herodotus’ singular voice – as an assertion of authority within the text (23) – and his
plural voice – as a marker of his ‘position as an audience to the events and characters he
describes’ (30).
35 Kurke (n. 18), 29. On Herodotus’ ‘dialogism’: Dewald (n. 34), 274–7.
36 Goldhill (n. 20), 28. He continues: ‘The author’s refusal to pass judgement becomes a lure
for the reader to adopt a critical position, to engage in the process of historiê.’ For similar, though
more reserved, comments: Boedeker (n. 22), 113: ‘All these rhetorical characteristics contribute
to give the Histories its uneven, anything-but-seamless character that places the audience in the
position of confidante and even collaborator with the speaker’; Dewald, (n. 34), 287: ‘We are inclined
to trust this voice because it is so open in its own firm declaration of tentative provisionality’ (all
my italics).
ambiguity. Norma Thompson has suggested that Herodotus like
Apollo ‘indicates’;37 I shall explore how the act of interpretation – in
this case reading – may be understood within an institutional frame-
work of reference set out by Herodotus’ appropriation of oracular
discourse.38
My enquiry takes three parts. Croesus, proverbial for the man who
has it all and Herodotus’ starting point for his enquiry, is where I begin.
By putting Croesus’ consultation of the oracle at the heart of his
opening account, Herodotus poses a question relating to the extent of
power – can the king’s rule extend over the oracle too? – and sets up
an opposition between two different forms of authority: between the
powerful individual who seeks to impose control over others and the
Panhellenic institution that claims access to unlimited knowledge. I
argue that the oracle not only challenges the king’s power but also
resists textual control: even as its text is written down, the way the
oracle is framed escapes Croesus’ – and our – comprehension. By
representing oracular ambiguity Herodotus prompts scholarly debate
over what we think the oracle means.
In my second section I take up the challenge to authority issued by
the Pythia by examining how two examples of Delphic oracular
consultations are embedded in Herodotus’ narrative. Croesus’ testing
of the central intelligence agency is interrupted by a digression on the
two predominant Greek powers that he might solicit to join his coali-
tion of the willing against Persia, Athens and Sparta. The account
about Sparta, the most powerful of the time, is structured around the
interpretation of oracles. Herodotus sets up an enquiry into why the
Spartans are (eventually) able to get the oracle right, while at the
same time using the oracle to put the reader through a process of real-
ising the significance of Spartan self-governance for that successful
outcome. At that time, the Athenians, being held down by tyranny, do
not present an attractive alliance to Croesus and are passed over.
Later, however, the Athenians themselves undertake an oracular
consultation, at a time when the issue of interpretation and identity is
at its most urgent: when their fledgling democracy is put at risk by the
Persian invasion. This, the famous ‘wooden-walls’ oracle that scholars
have found so problematic, acquires a clearer role in Herodotus’
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37 Thompson (n. 10), 14.
38 Kindt (n. 7) too understands oracular stories as reproducing ambiguity. However, whereas
she places emphasis on how ‘Herodotus uses Delphic oracle stories as the vehicle for statements
that require a greater authority than the historian can possess’ (115), I explore the construction
of a (Greek) reader through the process of dissenting from such authorial claims.
narrative once the role of the reader in performing interpretation
becomes stressed. Herodotus not only reports how the oracle is
brought back to the Athenian assembly, but also reproduces the
struggle over its meaning for his reader. By representing the process of
working through oracular ambiguity Herodotus valorizes the impor-
tance of debate at the centre of the Greek polis, and suggests a role for
his text in the wider political community.
The final section takes us back to Croesus and tests the thesis that
Herodotus constructs his text as an arena for thinking politically.
Read as a narrative that reproduces oracular ambiguity, I suggest that
Herodotus’ story about Croesus’ consultations performs the very
resistance to oppression that it depicts when representing the bound-
aries of and challenges to the king’s power. Readers may not only feel
superior to the king, whose attempts to exert control over the world
demonstrably fail when met by the oracle’s ambiguous responses.
They may also perform that superiority by approaching the act of
interpretation with a self-reflexive, critical attitude that the king (inev-
itably) lacks. Readers don’t just come to recognize what being Greek
means; Herodotus’ narrative puts them through it as a performance.
Challenging authority: Croesus tests the oracles
Herodotus begins his enquiry into why Greeks and barbarians came
into conflict with Croesus, king over all the nations west of the river
Halys, a figure, like Herodotus, on the margins of geography and his-
tory.39 ‘This Croesus,’ Herodotus relates, ‘was the first of those whom
we know who subjugated some of the Greeks and took tribute from
them . . . Before the rule of Croesus, all the Greeks were free.’40 For
Herodotus’ reader Croesus represents the archetypal eastern despot
who threatens the very basis of what it means to be Greek.
At the very height of his power, Herodotus explains, Croesus was
‘resolved, if he could, before the Persians became powerful, to take
hold of their increasing power’ (1.46.1). To achieve his ‘pre-emptive
strike’ he consults the intelligence community, oracles (1.46.3–47.1):
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39 Pelling (n. 18).
40 οupsilontildeasperυοΚ  Λσο$τοΚ βασβ0σψξ πσυοΚ υξ 5νε$Κ 6δνεξ υοupsilongraveΚ νξ λαυετυσ7αυο ’Εµµξψξ
-Κ ζ,σοφ 2παηψηξ . . . πσ δ υΚ Λσο0τοφ 2σγΚ π0ξυεΚ ’9µµθξεΚ :ταξ -µεupsilonacuteρεσοι: 1.6.2–3.
He sent out [messengers] in order to test the oracles for what they thought, so that if
he should discover that they knew the truth, he might send again and test them a
second time, whether he should take in hand a military expedition against the
Persians.
The rich and powerful Eastern king ‘tests’41 the wisdom of holy sites,
both – Herodotus relates – those of Greece and Libya, and including
Delphi, the navel of the Greek world. The episode marks a key site in
and over which the textual – and political – dynamic of knowledge
and power are played out. How will the Eastern despot fare when
testing such a key signifier of Greekness?
When the responses are returned (1.48.1–2),
Then Croesus unfolded each and looked at what had been written. In what the others
had to say nothing pleased him; but when he heard the oracle from Delphi, immedi-
ately he proclaimed it and accepted it, considering that the only oracle was the one
from Delphi, because it had discovered what he had been doing.
Croesus immediately accepts the truth of the Delphic oracle. After all,
he knows it’s true because his question to it was to describe what he
was doing.42 Not only is this oracle not predictive (for it is about what
is presently being done); the enquirer already knows the answer. This
is the clearest case of an agent reading into the oracle’s intelligence
report the interpretation he desires.
Given the fact that Croesus already knows the answer, this first
oracular consultation is unique in Herodotus’ narrative. For Croesus,
however, it represents a paradigm that guides all his subsequent
communications with the god at Delphi, including his response to the
question, whether he should attack Persia (1.54.1):
-πε0υε δ 2ξεξειγρξυα υ1 ρεοπσ,πια -πupsilonacuteρευο  Λσο$τοΚ! upsilonasperπεστρθ υε υο$τι
γσθτυθσ0οιτι! π0ηγφ υε -µπ0ταΚ λαυαµupsilonacuteτειξ υξ Λupsilonacuteσοφ βατιµθ0θξ=
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41 πεισ>νεξοΚ. This is a word with a good Greek tradition, used in the Odyssey of Odysseus
testing people (Homer, Od. 16.305, etc.) and his bow (21.394).
42 Kindt (n. 7), 99. For the Persian fascination with the truth: Thompson (n. 10), 84,
100–104.
When the divine responses had been brought back and Croesus had learnt of them,
he was overjoyed at the oracles, completely expecting that he would destroy the
kingdom of Cyrus.
As with the first oracle, Croesus is overjoyed.43 As a result, he
completely expects to defeat Cyrus. He fails to realise that the answer ‘a
great power will be destroyed’ could potentially refer to his own. His
notion of exchange, offering gifts in return for knowledge, though
based on traditional reciprocity and in itself pious, fails to compre-
hend the oracle’s fatal ambiguity.44 Croesus may represent the sole
voice of his people, but he cannot control the polysemic oracular
word.45 Kingly power versus the divine word is no contest – and that’s
the problem. In the absence of debate, or indeed any institutional possi-
bility for weighing up different options – it’s just Croesus and the
oracle – the oracular text remains obscure and latent with meaning.
The critical lack of reflection is signalled by the way in which the
oracle first responds to the test that Croesus has set up (1.47.3):
‘I know the number of the sands and the measures of the sea,
And I understand the dumb, and the man who does not speak I hear.
A smell comes to my senses of a mightily armoured tortoise
Being boiled in bronze together with lamb meat,
Bronze lies underneath, and bronze lies above.’
Before supplying the answer to Croesus’ test the oracle articulates its
mission statement: it can count and measure what cannot be counted
and measured; it can hear and understand what is unspoken.46 To
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43 ‘Each time Croesus receives a crucial response from Delphi, he reacts to it with a feeling
of (excessive) pleasure rather than careful reflection’: Kindt (n. 7), 102.
44 ‘Kroisos presumes an unproblematic gift exchange between his dedicatory offerings to
Apollo at Delphi and the god’s oracular responses, only to discover too late that the two repre-
sent discrete and incommensurable “economies”’: Kurke (n. 18), 152.
45 ‘When the despot constitutes nomos, it is unstable and self-interested; when nomos is
despot, the limitations provide an arena of freedom. Self-discipline and valour are encouraged by
self-governing institutions’: Lateiner (n. 17), 184–5.
46 Plutarch substitutes µαµοξυοΚ for ζψξεupsilontildeξυοΚ: the oracle (or god) hears, or pays attention
to, ‘the man who doesn’t babble’ (Moralia 512e: λα λψζοupsilontilde ωφξ0θτι λα οupsilonlenis µαµοξυοΚ 2λοupsilonacuteει). In
this version the oracular response appears to emphasize not so much its ability to comprehend
everything (as in Herodotus) as its impatience with the testy enquirer – one way of reading this
oracle consultation in Herodotus. That man is a fool who thinks he can test the oracle . . . Cf.
Chamberlain (n. 34), 24.
measure the immeasurable and comprehend the dumb signifies – if
we can say it signifies any one thing – an excess of signification. It
demands careful reflection and interpretation, yet Croesus pays it no
heed.
The frame is superfluous to Croesus’ desire to confirm what (he
thinks) he knows; but it is critical for recognizing the oracle’s ambi-
guity and appreciating its response. There is ideology to the polysemy.
The (Eastern) despot fails to comprehend the different ways of
reading the (Greek) hexameter verse. But it goes further than that.
First, Croesus’ story is plotted on a (Greek) tragic paradigm that
sympathetically stages his tragedy.47 Second, Croesus is a good friend
of Delphi, and Apollo does everything he can for him (1.91). Third,
and more tellingly, Croesus’ testing of the oracles is described in
terms that could mirror Herodotus’ own practice of enquiry: when
Croesus had set the test for the oracles, he had commissioned his
messengers to record the oracular responses in writing; when they
returned with the written responses, he ‘looks at what had been
written down’ – or, in the case of Delphi, ‘when he heard it’ (1.48). In
that act of inscription, Croesus attempts to fix the text and supposes
that by doing so he controls its meaning. He expects a simple inter-
pretative process of matching the signs to his own expectations; but
that is precisely what Herodotus’ own recording of the oracle resists.
For the reader, as much as Croesus, gets more, much more, than what
was bargained for. Herodotus does not reveal the meaning of the
oracle’s frame any more than Croesus takes it into consideration.48
This is important. In this paradigmatic oracle, the reader is explic-
itly invited to enter into the struggle over interpretation and look
beyond – or read deeper into – Croesus’ staged scenario.49 One reader
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47 A tragic pattern that Herodotus ‘appropriates and modifies’ (7) to ‘define and demon-
strate the distinctive methods, interests, and intentions of his own innovative discourse’:
C. C. Chiasson, ‘Herodotus’ Use of Attic Tragedy in the Lydian Logos’, CA 22 (2003), 5–36, at
p. 32. Cf. S. Saïd, ‘Herodotus and Tragedy’, in E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. de Jong and H. Van Wees
(eds.), Brill’s Companion to Herodotus (Leiden, 2002), 117–47.
48 D. E. W. Wormell, ‘Croesus and the Delphic Oracle’s Omniscience’, Hermathena 97
(1963), 20–2, reads into the opening frame of the oracle the ‘real’ event behind Croesus’ actions:
he was building up a war-chest, ‘and while coinage may be deaf and dumb, “money talks’’’ (21).
For Kindt (n. 7), 100, the frame reasserts the distinction between man and god after Croesus
had attempted ‘to communicate with Apollo in the god’s own language and on the same terms’
(100).
49 Both frame and answer are up for grabs, for ‘this [oracle], unlike all the others, has gone
undeciphered . . . The response . . . is a mere restatement of Croesus’ deed, and exactly what is
implied in boiling lamb and a tortoise together in a cauldron remains a mystery’: M. Dobson,
‘Herodotus 1.47.1 and the Hymn to Hermes: A Solution to the Test Oracle’, AJP 100 (1979),
349–59 (quotation from 351).
to do just this is Malales, who significantly tags the oracle with an
additional line: ‘And King Croesus and his Lydians try to play me.’50
That addition makes explicit what remains in Herodotus only a
suggestion: namely, that the oracle perceives that Croesus has cooked
something up to test it, that in effect Croesus has a hidden agenda.
So, another reading might, for example, posit a connection between
the oracle’s representation of Croesus’ act and the Homeric Hymn to
Hermes. During the course of this narrative Hermes makes a lyre from
a tortoise shell, which he later trades for honours from his big brother;
in Herodotus Croesus makes mincemeat of the tortoise and mixes it
with other meat in his cauldron. Not only is the image suggestive of
Croesus damaging Apollo’s goods and being deliberately deceptive,
but the oracle’s repeated description of the cauldron as bronze evokes
the common Homeric epithet for weapons of war. Has the god seen
through the smoke in Croesus’ kitchen to the imperialist ambitions he
is seasoning?51 Oracular meaning, which Croesus had so carefully
prepared and endeavoured to keep a lid on, bubbles over. Double
double toil and trouble . . .
It seems clear that Croesus gets the wrong end of a burning stick,
because he trusts too easily and comprehensively in his own power,
and fails to comprehend the possibility for alternative meaning(s). It
seems equally clear that the (Greek) reader is invited to understand
the (Eastern) king’s downfall as a result of his misunderstanding the
oracle. But that hardly empties this oracle of its meaning. By repre-
senting the paradigmatic oracle in this way, Herodotus reproduces its
famed ambiguity and implicates the reader into the struggle of and
over interpretation.52 This test hardly promotes a sense of superiority
over the king. It certainly does not allow a complacent view of who we
think we are, and what we think we are doing when we are reading.
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50 πα0?ειξ δ νε πεισ8υαι Λσο$τοΚ  βατιµεupsilongraveΚ λα οA υοupsilonacuteυοφ Μφδο0: Chronicle 6.8 (Dind.
154/155.10–11). Cf. Lucian, Cat. 14.
51 This is something similar to the ‘solution’ proposed by Dobson (n. 49), 358: ‘Thus it is
suggested through comparing Hymn and oracle that Croesus is performing a symbolic act of
great impropriety in setting oracular accoutrements together in a less than sacral fashion.
Furthermore, whereas the oracular response appears to be merely a restatement of his actions, it
is in fact a moral reprimand.’
52 ‘On one reading, Herodotus’ Croesus Logos is a story of what happens if one challenges
and oversteps the border between the divine and human spheres. Croesus’ fall can be read as an
indirect result of his lack of orientation resulting from his misreading of Delphic oracles’: Kindt
(n. 7), 102. Xenophon’s ‘Croesus’ similarly reads his downfall as a result of having tested Apollo,
as if by doing so he had provoked the god’s wrath (Cyr. 7.2.17). But see Christ (n. 27), 189–92,
who argues that, in Herodotus at least, Croesus’ testing is not hubristic; his downfall comes
about by his later failure to match the same exacting standards.
Framing oracles: constructing the text as a site of debate
Herodotus’ representation of Croesus’ test displays to the reader the
difficulty of setting a text down in writing and controlling its signifi-
cance. The point we noticed above all was the slipperiness of the
frame that introduced Delphi’s response to Croesus – a context that
the royal individual singularly fails to take note of and respond to.
Given the importance of the oracle’s framing it may be instructive
to look at the narrative that follows, in which Croesus’ impetus to
extend his coalition takes the king and the narrative to Sparta and
Athens, the two predominant Greek powers of Herodotus’ time. At the
time of asking, however, the Spartans clearly lead the way. In the
narrator’s embedded reporting of Spartan expansion, the oracle again
plays a crucial explanatory role particularly in the way it points to the
founding of Sparta’s laws as the critical moment in their history – a
moment the readers are invited to find for themselves. What remains
implicit in this early digression on Sparta – that is, the founding of an
institutional context for interpretation – is brought out by Herodotus’
later account of the crisis point for the Athenians, when they consult
Delphi on the eve of the Persian invasion. Herodotus not only records
how they submit the oracles for debate in their assembly; he also
reproduces the dialectical structure of debate in his narrative to
submit the reader to a similar process of deliberation.
The Spartan embedded reportage: digging for bones
At the time of asking, the Spartans appear the ideal allies for Croesus:
they too have an agenda of conquest. Their consultation meets with
the following response from the Pythia (1.66.2):
`σλαδ0θξ νB αυε$ΚC νηα νB αυε$Κ· οupsilonlenisacute υοι δ>τψ=
ποµµο -ξ `σλαδ0D βαµαξθζ0ηοι 4ξδσεΚ Eατιξ!
οF τB 2πολψµupsilonacuteτοφτιξ= -ηG δ υοι οupsilonlenisacuteυι νεηα0σψ=
δ>τψ υοι Υεηθξ ποττ0λσουοξ Iσγτατραι
λα λαµξ πεδ0οξ τγο0ξJ διανευστατραι=
‘You ask me for Arcadia? You ask me something great. No, I won’t grant it.
Many are the acorn-eating men in Arcadia,
Who will hinder you. But really I don’t begrudge you:
I’ll give you Tegea to dance on with stamping feet
And the beautiful plain to be measured out with rope.’
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On hearing the oracle the Spartans immediately rush off to war,
carrying with them chains to enslave the Tegeans, trusting – as
Herodotus pointedly remarks – in a ‘counterfeit oracle’.53 Having
failed to analyse the oracular text properly, they return trussed up in
chains of their own doing. Another case, undoubtedly, of a consulta-
tion (this time by a group of Greeks), which satisfies expectations –
but fails. Another case, too, in which the reader may feel superior –
but not perhaps without a degree of anxiety brought about by the
narrator glossing the oracle as . In what sense is the oracle
‘counterfeit’, a ‘dodgy dossier’? On the face of it, Herodotus might
seem to be criticizing Delphi’s intelligence community for having
deceived their Spartan overlords.54 Harrison argues, however, that the
meaning need not be pejorative unless we suppose that Herodotus
‘thought clarity to be a necessary or desirable characteristic in a
prophecy’55 – or, indeed, in any other kind of forward planning.
Herodotus’ glossing of the oracle then poses a series of questions: Did
the oracle set out to deceive the Spartans? Or did the Spartans
deceive themselves in the manner of their enquiry? Or did the oracle
invite such a lack of critical reflection by its ambiguous language,
especially with its concessionary, ‘I don’t begrudge you’? And through
whose eyes do we see the oracle as being dodgy anyway, Herodotus’
(as a pro-active authorial warning) or the Spartans’ (in bitter hind-
sight)? There’s no escaping our responsibility in reading the oracle.
Herodotus’ language confronts us with making a judgement about
what we think the oracle is all about and taking responsibility for that
judgement – the very thing the Spartans (had to) learn the hard way.56
‘But in the time of Croesus,’ Herodotus continues, ‘the Spartans
had gained the upper hand’ (1.67.1). The reason for this is put down
to the successful interpretation of an oracle. They receive this second
oracle – on the whereabouts of the bones of Orestes – with much
greater care (1.67.4–5). First, they acknowledge that even with the
oracle ‘they were no nearer to the discovery, though they were
searching everywhere’ (1.67.5). Second, the search for meaning is
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53 γσθτν! λιβδµJ π0τφξοι: 1.66.3.
54 Flower (n. 16) glosses the use of λιβδ at 1.75.2 as follows: ‘This is a fairly strong
pejorative term suggesting that the oracle was at best unclear and probably deceptive . . . cf.
1.66.3, where Herodotus criticizes the ambiguous oracle given to the Spartans about Tegea’ (71,
71 n. 96, my italics).
55 Harrison (n. 7), 152 n. 109.
56 Glossing ‘counterfeit’, Kurke (n. 18), 153, comments: ‘The breakdown of human-divine
reciprocal understanding is thus figured as a conflict of exchange systems – the Spartans
assuming the “good faith economy” of gift exchange, the oracle in fact intruding like a counter-
feit coin to violate the “trust” of the Homoioi.’
described in terms of a collaborative venture.57 Herodotus relates how
a certain Lichas ‘brings together’ the various pieces of the jigsaw to
solve the puzzle.58 But this Lichas is not working alone: he is a
member of the Spartan special forces who – Herodotus explains for
us – are often sent out by the ‘common body’59 for one duty or
another; when he reports his discovery, the Spartans send him back to
get the bones under the pretence of exiling him (1.68.5). Lichas may
use his own intelligence – and luck – to crack the code, but even so he
is represented as working within a larger group. An individual acts,
but his performance results from and gives service to the Spartan civic
structure. The individual’s performance of interpretation takes place
in relation to, and on behalf of, a wider ‘interpretative community’.60
More can be said, however. Herodotus himself clearly describes
Lichas’ thinking and explains what each line of the oracle means
(1.68.3–5):
 δ -ξξ>ταΚ υ1 µεη,νεξα τφξεβ0µµευο υξ BΟστυεα λαυ1 υ ρεοπσ,πιοξ υοupsilontildeυοξ
εLξαι! υMδε τφνβαµµ,νεξοΚ· υοupsilontilde γαµλοΚ δupsilonacuteο σψξ ζupsilonacuteταΚ υοupsilongraveΚ 2ξνοφΚ εupsilonasperacuteσιτλε
-,ξυαΚ! υξ δ 4λνοξα λα υξ τζupsilontildeσαξ υ,ξ υε υupsilonacuteποξ λα υξ 2ξυ0υφποξ! υξ δ
-ωεµαφξ,νεξοξ τ0δθσοξ υ πνα -π πναυι λε0νεξοξ! λαυ1 υοι,ξδε υι ελ0?ψξ! OΚ
-π λαλ! 2ξρσ>ποφ τ0δθσοΚ 2ξεupsilonacuteσθυαι= τφνβαµ,νεξοΚ δ υαupsilontildeυα λα 2πεµρGξ -Κ
Τπ0συθξ Eζσα?ε Μαλεδαινοξ0οιτι π8ξ υ πσηνα=
Taking in mind what was said, [Lichas] made the connection with the oracle that this
was Orestes, making the connection in this way: he discovered that the ‘winds’ were
the blacksmith’s two pairs of bellows; the ‘smiting and counter-smiting’ the hammer
and anvil; and the ‘woe on woe’ was the drawn-out iron, conjecturing in this way that
iron has been discovered to be an evil for mankind. Having made these connections,
he went back to Sparta where he declared the whole thing to the Spartans.
The reader is led through a process of ‘bringing together’
( ) the different parts of the jigsaw for himself. This is
16 PAGING THE ORACLE IN HERODOTUS’ HISTORY
57 Kurke (n. 18), 154, suggests that ‘the oracle seems to align itself with civic structures’.
Contrast Kindt (n. 7), 106–7, who emphasizes Lichas’ isolation.
58 τφνβ0µµετραι: 1.68.3 (bis), 68.5. τφνβ0µµετραι appears to be a key index to interpreta-
tion: applied by Herodotus to his own reasoning (at 2.33.2, 112.2; 4.15.1, 45.2, 87.2; 6.80; 7.24,
184.1, 187.2; 8.30.1), and to the reasoning of others (2.33.2; 3.68.2; 5.1.3; 6.107.2 (bis), 108.1;
7.10, 142.2, 189.2; 8.94.2). See further the discussion of the ‘wooden-walls’ oracle below.
59 υ! λοιξ!: 1.67.5.
60 The phrase is culled from Stanley Fish, Is there a Text in this Class? (Cambridge, Mass.,
1980). He applies it, however, to academic ‘schools’ of thought and their power to constitute the
objectives by which texts are judged (338), whereas I wish to denote the institutional framework
within which the agent works, a context which Herodotus represents and, to a certain extent,
reproduces in his text. Chamberlain (n. 34) similarly argues against the view that Herodotus’ first
person plural statements should be read as appealing to a ready-made ‘limited community of
like-minded critics’ (5).
significant. In the case of the paradigmatic oracle given to Croesus,
Herodotus’ text had reproduced something of the oracle’s ambiguity
to point up not only the inadequacy of the king’s response, but also
the lack of any opportunity within the institution of autocracy itself to
respond well. On this occasion Herodotus very carefully guides his
readers through the analysis of the oracle’s text, so very carefully in
fact as to render the act of interpretation transparent.61 Lichas goes
back to Sparta and ‘declares the whole thing’ to his community; the
narrative mimics that translation of the oracle by ‘declaring the whole
thing’ to a community of readers. Herodotus not only represents
Lichas’ interpretation as taking place vis-à-vis a civic context; by
placing his readers on a par with Lichas’ Spartans, Herodotus
constructs his text as a space that might also be regarded as civic, as
also bringing power to the people. His very gesture of openness, then,
is a lure to elicit authority for his text.
This oracle, the last of a series given to the Spartans and the first
within Herodotus’ enquiry to be interpreted correctly, indicates the
single agent’s role within a recognizable civic structure. To what do
the Spartans owe this common framework? Herodotus’ account of
Spartan hegemony (the feature that most attracts the like-minded
Croesus) begins with a curious oracle given to Lycurgus, Sparta’s
founding father (1.65.2):
When Lycurgus went into the hall, the Pythia immediately said these things:
‘You come, Lycurgus, to my rich temple,
Dear to Zeus and to all who dwell in the house of Olympus.
I am at a loss whether to prophesy you as a god or a man:
But I expect you are more of a god, Lycurgus.’
What strikes most readers of this oracle is its lack of obvious purpose:
‘There is no message, if the four verses that Herodotus quotes are the
whole response.’62 The absence of a message results from the absence
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61 Kindt (n. 7), 106, notes the ‘strikingly elaborate’ description of Lichas’ train of thought,
an account she assigns to the ‘voice of the omniscient narrator’. She passes over, however, the
question of why we should get such an account here.
62 Fontenrose (n. 5), 116 (my italics). He continues: ‘It may well be that its lack of message
caused someone to add the two hexameters that Diodorus quotes; but they amount to no more
of a context, as the narrative imitates the Pythia’s act of spontaneity:
the oracle appears spontaneously in the text with neither an introduc-
tion nor any indication of its relevance. Not knowing why the
consultation was made in the first place or why the Pythia should
answer in these terms – it appears more of a statement than an oracle
– invites speculation and throws weight on Herodotus’ subsequent
narration of the Spartans’ nomoi (1.65.4):
οA νξ δ υιξεΚ πσΚ υοupsilonacuteυοιτι µηοφτι λα ζσ0ται αupsilonlenisυ! υξ Πφρ0θξ υξ ξupsilontildeξ
λαυετυευα λ,τνοξ ΤπασυιυDτι! OΚ δB αupsilonlenisυο Μαλεδαιν,ξιοι µηοφτι . . . -λ
ΛσυθΚ 2ηαητραι υαupsilontildeυα=
Some say that the priestess also declared to him the government that is now estab-
lished for the Spartans; but the Spartans themselves say that Lycurgus brought these
changes from Crete.
Some interpreters, Herodotus explains, connect Lycurgus’ oracular
consultation to his subsequent establishment of Sparta’s institutional
framework. (Is this why the oracle addresses Lycurgus as a god,
because he – so the story goes – laid down the law for the Spartans?)
The implicit basis of Lichas’ later, successful interpretation of the
Orestes oracle is the institutional framework within which he operates;
here Herodotus invites his readers to relate its foundation to an
oracle. The process that readers go through if they choose to make
that move is significant: in the very exercise of interpretation they
realise the importance of the institutional setting for getting interpreta-
tion right. Though the act of reading is in and of itself individual,
Herodotus’ readers may perform that act in relation to, or even as part
of, a civic group. Reading is not (yet) conceived of, or represented as,
a solitary practice – as the example of Lichas demonstrates.
The way Herodotus embeds in his Croesus narrative the digression
about the Spartans’ successful interpretation of oracles encourages
deeper reading and a process of ‘bringing together’ different signs. My
suggestion has been to read the Spartan oracles together and to relate
the successful working out of the Orestes oracle to the foundation of
an institutional framework that makes such an interpretative process
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than a statement that Apollo will give Sparta the finest constitution of any city’s.’ Diodorus
Siculus’ two lines of explanation that give Lycurgus’ consultation and the subsequent oracle
some meaning are as follows (7.12.1): QλειΚ δB εupsilonlenisξον0αξ αυεupsilonacuteνεξοΚ· αupsilonlenisυ1σ Eηψηε / δ>τψ υξ
οupsilonlenisλ 4µµθ -πιγροξ0θ π,µιΚ Rωει= ‘You come in search of good law; and I /shall give you the type
that no other city on this earth will have.’ This gloss suggests the importance of the Spartans’
nomoi for thinking about the oracle along the lines that I argue here.
possible.63 Moreover, the impromptu oracle prompts a response that
realizes the potential within the narrative for reading as a member of a
group of free citizens. The act of reading is thus framed by an inter-
pretative community. At the same time, however, Herodotus places
emphasis on the individual’s responsibility for getting interpretation
right. His narrative both represents and supplants the civic context of
interpretation.
The Athenian debate: dismantling wooden-walls
I have just suggested that responding to the oracle invites a reading
that both is informed by, and seeks to replace, a public institutional
context. To follow up this claim, I fast forward to the crisis point – the
war between Greeks and barbarians. On the eve of the Persian inva-
sion of Attica, an invasion which puts at stake the very existence of the
Athenian polis and, more generally, threatens the very idea of a Greek
identity, the Athenians consult Delphi: should they stay or should they
go? The oracle that the Athenians get in reply – containing the noto-
rious lines about the ‘wooden-wall’ – has attracted enormous interest.
Various attempts have aimed at reconstructing its original text, date,
composition and reception, and at assessing its ‘historical’ role in the
Greek resistance to the Persian invasion.64 For my purposes, it affords
an opportunity not only to compare the respective practices in
consulting oracles of Croesus and the Athenians, but also to show
more explicitly the performative aspect of reading oracles within
Herodotus’ narrative.
Faced by the threat of the Persian invasion, the Athenians go to
Delphi to consult the oracle. The response is so gloomy that on the
advice of a certain Delphian official they ask for another (7.141).
Though barely more cheery, this oracle about Salamis and wooden-
walls is accepted and taken back to Athens. There are two features
about this episode I want to consider.
First, there are two oracles. Though the first oracle is often passed
over with little or no comment, Herodotus sets up the oracles to be
read together (7.139.6–140.1):65
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63 A point that gains emphasis when we return to Croesus’ story to find him still a solitary
reader and still reading wrongly.
64 Searching for authenticity: e.g. N. Robertson, ‘The True Meaning of the “Wooden Wall”’,
CP 82 (1987), 1–20. For a critique of this and of other attempts: Maurizio (n. 7), 308, 329–30.
65 Harrison (n. 7), 151–2.
Nor did the fearful oracles that came from Delphi and threw them into fear cause
them to flee Greece, but standing firm they resolved to meet the invader of their
country. For the Athenians had sent messengers to Delphi and were ready to receive
an oracle . . .
The fact that the initial oracle is not explicitly deliberated on by the
Athenians may mean it slips from view. But Herodotus’ grouping of
the oracles together clearly invites the reader to consider the relation-
ship between the two. And, because the first receives no further
elaboration or elucidation, the narrative places an onus on the readers
to work it out for themselves.
One recent scholar to have taken up the challenge is Lisa Maurizio.
She suggests that the first oracle frames interpretation of the second.
In the first, the language of the body dominates, representing Athens
as a living being: answering the second oracle then means determining
what Athens stands for, ‘its population or its physical territory’. As she
puts it, ‘These two oracles reflect a crisis in the very definition of
Athens as a city.’66 The question of identity, however, is not, I suggest,
limited to the Athenians in the text. A similar crisis is set before the
reader.
Let me explain by exploring in greater depth a second important
point: that is, Herodotus’ structuring of this account. We have already
noted the juxtaposition of two oracles, which invites comparison and
deliberation. That gesture is brought out by the narrative: Herodotus
relates how the oracle is written down by the ambassadors and taken
to the people for consideration.67 (Nothing could be further from
Croesus’ solipsistic, emotional and immediate response to the orac-
ular text.) What is particularly interesting for our argument is the way
in which Herodotus subsequently represents the assembly. His narra-
tive telescopes the discussion on to the problem of interpretation. In
particular, he articulates a struggle over how to understand the phrase
‘wooden-walls’ – either literally as the wall surrounding the Acropolis,
or more metaphorically as a fleet of ships. The official interpreters
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66 Maurizio (n. 7), 331. She continues, ‘Whether they reflect particular historical details and
can be mined for them, as many scholars have tried to do, is unlikely.’
67 OΚ δ 2πεµρ,ξυεΚ οA ρεοπσ,ποι 2πηηεµµοξ -Κ υξ δνοξ: 7.142.1.
‘clung to the letter of the oracle’,68 insisting on a literal translation
that replays Croesus’ earlier obsession with sticking to what was
written. Their inability to make the mental leap beyond that is
brought out by Themistocles’ criticism: he was arguing that they were
not ‘putting together rightly’69 the meaning. In an open debate over
how to interpret, as much as what to interpret, Themistocles provides
a more convincing case for his audience than the professionals can
manage. Reasoned argument overcomes the expertise of a closed
group. This is arguably the clearest example of the importance – and
success – of debate in Herodotus.70
But there is an additional point to bring to bear on our analysis that
is suggested by the way in which the narrator sets up the debate
(7.142.1):
There were many alternative opinions of those enquiring into the oracle’s meaning,
and those that stood together most of all were the following.
By drawing attention to the ‘many other opinions’ that were being put
forward in the assembly, before narrowing the focus to the two he
records, Herodotus displays a self-consciousness in his structuring of
this episode of a degree normally ascribed to Thucydides.71 What is
more, this frame involves the reader in the ensuing debate. The issue
depends on how we translate . This could
simply indicate ‘those opinions that held together the best’, those that
were the ‘most convincing’.72 Indeed, in what follows Herodotus
describes the two opinions that best accord with the process of
‘interpreting’ ( ), a label that is applied to the oracle
interpreters even as Themistocles rejects their interpretation.73 Yet,
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68 W. W. How and J. Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus (Oxford, 1912), 184 n. 142.2.
69 οupsilonlenisλ Eζθ π8ξ IσρΚ υοupsilongraveΚ γσθτνοµ,ηοφΚ τφνβ0µµετραι: 7.143.1.
70 Democratic debate contesting notions of priestly authority: M. Detienne, The Masters of
Truth in Archaic Greece (New York, 1996 [1967]), 89–106. Herodotus goes on to describe the
pay-back for those who insist on the literal meaning of the ‘wooden-walls’: still believing that the
wooden-walls of the Acropolis would save them (8.51.2), all are killed when the Persians storm
the barricades (8.53.2).
71 As, for example, Thucydides’ introduction to the Mytilenean debate: λαυατυ0τθΚ δB
εupsilonlenisρupsilongraveΚ -λλµθτ0αΚ 4µµαι υε ηξναι 2ζB Sλ0τυψξ -µηοξυο (3.36.6). He goes on to represent the
assembly in terms of a contest between Cleon and Diodotus.
72 As suggested to me by Christopher Pelling.
73 Herodotus denotes the ‘interpretation’ of the oracle experts ( : 7.142.2);
Themistocles contests that ‘interpretation’ ( : 7.143.1) and argues for a better
‘interpretation’ ( : 7.143.2).
that is not how it is usually taken, and this must, I think, relate to the
account that follows, in which Herodotus investigates the wrangle
over the oracle’s disputed lines. Thus, most scholars have taken
to mean ‘those opinions that were in dispute
most of all’, those that were ‘most opposed’.74 If this is right, and
Herodotus is indicating his selection of the two most opposed argu-
ments of the day, such a gesture would render his account even more
strikingly ‘Thucydidean’. But, more importantly, his framing of the
debate invites such a reading. It sets the readers up to perform for
themselves the process of debate.
It is significant, for example, that scholars who talk about the
capacity of debate to rationalize the divine word use this oracle.
Manetti, for example, describes how:
The discrete binary logic of the dialectic alternative gives way to the continuum of the
gradated logic of the preferable. It could well be that the discussion so far has caused
us to lose sight for a moment of the fact that the object in debate is a prophecy of
Apollo. This is significant, for the logic applied to the interpretation of the divinatory
response is precisely the same as that which governs political assemblies.75
Here Manetti equates the way of responding to oracles with the
notion of debate that is conducted in the assembly. But in fact it is
Herodotus who encourages exactly such an interpretative process by
the way in which he has structured the episode according to alterna-
tive, even contrary, arguments. It is Herodotus who renders the
interpretation of the divinatory response the same as that which governs
political assemblies.
This is important. Jean-Pierre Vernant has also used the wooden-
wall oracle as an example of dialectical logic;76 but the general thrust
of his analysis stresses the difference of oracular interpretation from
the ‘public and conflictual debate’ performed in the Greek polis:
From this point of view, it is noteworthy that in classical Greece we find oracular
activity concentrated for the most part around the great sanctuaries, whose Panhellenic
character relegates them to the margins of the city. They are outside the institutional
framework that defines the civic community and that, with free discussion and the right
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74 ‘Amongst the various opinions which were expressed there were two mutually exclusive
interpretations’: A. de Sélincourt, Herodotus Histories (London, 1996). Cf. How and Wells (n.
68), 183 n. 142.1; R. W. Macan, Herodotus (London, 1908), 191 n. 142.1; E. von Heinrich Stein,
Herodotus (Berlin, 1963), 137 n. 142.1.
75 Manetti (n. 10), 34 (my italics).
76 J.-P. Vernant, ‘The Individual within the City State’, in F. I. Zeitlin (ed.), Mortals and
Immortals: Collected Essays of J-P Vernant (Princeton, 1991), 303–17 (311).
to vote, makes each of its members a fully participating citizen in all the processes of
decision concerning public affairs.77
Bringing this perspective to bear on our discussion, I want to sum up
Herodotus’ oracles to Athens by making two points. First, he firmly
locates them within the context of the assembly. That is to say, far from
being on the margins Herodotus relocates the oracle of Delphi at the
centre of the institutional framework that defines the civic community:
oracular interpretation is a matter of debate for the group at large.
Second, and following on from this move, Herodotus uses oracular
consultation to construct his text as an arena of interpretation that
may stand on a par with the assembly itself. In other words,
Herodotus places both the oracle and his text at the centre of the
polis. Herodotus’ enquiry, which – by virtue of being written – would
normatively stand outside the institutional framework of the polis, by
means of his re-presentation of oracles invites a reader to participate
fully in the processes of decision-making. It is not just the oracle that is
the site of struggle and conflict; Herodotus’ text itself becomes the
battleground over which the readers fight for control of meaning and
for their own identity.
The way in which Herodotus structures his account of this double
oracular consultation and subsequent debate reproduces a resistance
to the truth and authority of the written text, a resistance such as that
which Herodotus the narrator had urged when praising the Athenians
for their reaction to the oracles.78 The issue is greater than how
Herodotus’ narrative invites its readers ‘to be analysed and inter-
preted themselves’;79 that process of self-reflection – appropriated
from the context of oracular interpretation – is a political one. ‘The
difference between the Herodotus and the Persian approach is one of
suspicion and uncertainty as opposed to passivity.’80 Representing the
oracle is not neutral but fundamental to a reading of his text. Fighting
– reading – for Greece . . .
To explore some of the consequences of this reading, I follow
Croesus and consult the oracle one last time.
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77 Vernant (n. 76), 306 (my italics).
78 ‘But standing firm they were resolved to meet the invader of their country’ (7.139).
Herodotus’ narratorial comment leads directly in to an analysis of the pair of oracles, as he
continues: ‘For the Athenians had sent messengers to Delphi’ (7.140.1). For Greek resistance:
Thompson (n. 10), 104; Harrison (n. 7), 149–52. Cf. Manetti (n. 10), 33.
79 Kindt (n. 7), 65.
80 Thompson (n. 10), 84; cf. 95.
Performing enquiry: Croesus’ final consultation
In the first section I argued that Herodotus represents Delphi’s orac-
ular response in such a way that he reproduces its ambiguity and
displays the difficulty of controlling the divine word even once it has
been written down. In the second section I explored two examples
that indicate the importance of Herodotus’ framing of the Delphic
oracle and that suggest he constructs his text as an arena of interpre-
tation on a par with, and in place of, the public institutional space of
the assembly. In this final section I explore this last claim further by
reflecting on how Herodotus begins and ends Croesus’ oracular
consultations.
In the first section I noted how Croesus receives oracular responses
to his test in the following manner (1.48.1–2):
Then Croesus unfolded each and looked at what had been written. In what the others
had to say nothing pleased him; but when he heard the oracle from Delphi, immedi-
ately he proclaimed it and accepted it, considering that the only oracle was the one
from Delphi, because it had discovered what he had been doing.
Thus Delphi is extolled by Croesus as the oracle. Yet, in the very next
paragraph Herodotus continues (1.49.1):
( )
Such was the oracle from Delphi to Croesus. As to the answer from the oracle of
Amphiareus, I am not able to say what it said to the Lydians once they had followed
the temple custom (for this is not said), other than for the fact that Croesus consid-
ered that he had acquired in this one too an oracle that did not lie.
Having just proclaimed Delphi as the only oracle, Croesus –
according to Herodotus – also thought that the oracle of Amphiareus
was ‘not lying’. In fact, throughout this episode Croesus consults and
receives answers from both Delphi and Amphiareus (1.53.1, 53.3,
54.1) – though it is always Delphi that is kept in focus. How can
Delphi be acclaimed as the only true oracle in one breath, when in the
next the truthfulness of a rival site is conceded?81 Is it Croesus who is
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81 ‘One might suppose that the unsuccessful replies had been hushed up, and the incident
forgotten as quickly as possible by the other oracle centres. But Herodotus himself found that
the oracle of Amphiaraus had been honoured, like that of Delphi . . . Herodotus himself was
inconsistent, who readily accepts Delphi as the one true oracle before
he has all the evidence in front of him? Or is the problem one of the
narrator’s doing who, since he was ‘not able to say’ what its response
was, adds grudgingly that it was also true? And does this in turn
reveal a critical process of selectivity in which the historian privileges
Delphi (presumably because this is the oracle to which he has
access)?82 Or is it rather the reader’s problem for failing to notice the
author’s clear markers of uncertainty in his account, tempted perhaps
by the prospect of Delphi’s success in delivering the Eastern despot’s
come-uppance? Frustrating a facile reading of his text, his account of
the oracular responses reproduces something of their ambiguity. The
oracular texts may suffer from a lack of debate when written down
and shown to Croesus; but Herodotus constructs exactly such an
interpretative crisis for his reader. In his act of inscription, of writing
down the logoi that he has collected, Herodotus poses a series of ques-
tions concerning not only issues of composition but also the reader’s
interpretation of and performance within that narrative.
The Lydios logos ends with Croesus visiting Delphi one last time. He
wants to know why his previous consultations got his fingers burnt –
and much more besides. On this basis alone it is already a kind of
meta-consultation, an enquiry into how and why his previous enquiry
had gone wrong. Apollo’s response continues in the same vein
(1.91.1, 4):
. . .
‘It is not possible to escape the appointed fate, even for a god: Croesus has fulfilled
the error of his fifth-generation ancestor, who though a guard of the Heracleidae was
led by feminine guile to murder his master and take the honour of that man which
was not fitting for him . . . As to the oracle that was given, Croesus does not rightly
blame it. For Loxias declared to him that, should he attack Persia, he would destroy a
great power . . .’
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aware of the inconsistency, and appends the oracle centre of Amphiaraus to that of Delphi in a
couple of places in his narrative. But it is evident that it does not fit’: Parke and Wormell (n. 5),
131–2 (my italics).
82 Before recording Delphi’s response, Herodotus admits, ‘What the rest of the oracles
divined, it is not said by anyone’ (T υι νξ ξφξ υ1 µοιπ1 υξ γσθτυθσ0ψξ -ρτπιτε! οupsilonlenis µηευαι
πσΚ οupsilonlenisδανξ: 1.47.2).
Croesus had failed to ask the proper questions – and, anyway, it was
his fate. This affirms our reading of Croesus’ consultations83 – but is
the pay-back as transparent as all that? Of course Croesus gets it
wrong, because he failed to ask the appropriate follow-up questions.
But if he had done, would he have been able to change things when it
was his fate?84 When all is said and done, whether or not Croesus asks
which power he will destroy is beside the point, since he fulfils the
error of his ancestor. And yet, Croesus does in fact lose his empire
because he failed to interpret the oracle correctly. Damned if you do,
damned if you don’t . . .
Consulting the oracle has a twist in the tale for the reader – not
only Croesus. (That is the danger of approaching the oracle, with an
answer already in mind.) Herodotus invites us throughout this narra-
tive to dissent from Croesus’ reading of the oracle and to see this as a
fault of an institutional system that privileges the rule of one man.
But, in the end, the reader is asked to remember the first oracle that
Herodotus had narrated, the one which had concluded his opening
account of Gyges (1.13.2):
υοτ,ξδε νξυοι εLπε 5 Πφρ0θ! OΚ ’Θσαλµε0δDτι υ0τιΚ Qωει -Κ υξ πνπυοξ 2π,ηοξοξ
Ηupsilonacuteηεψ= υοupsilonacuteυοφ υοupsilontilde EπεοΚ Μφδο0 υε λα οA βατιµεΚ αupsilonlenisυξ µ,ηοξ οupsilonlenisδξα -ποιεupsilontildeξυο!
πσξ δ -πευεµτρθ=
The Pythia however said this: that vengeance for the Heracleidae would visit in the
fifth generation of Gyges. Of this utterance the Lydians and their kings took no
account, until it was fulfilled . . .
Herodotus expressly warns us that ‘no-one took account of’ this
oracle. Having read through the subsequent narrative of Croesus’
downfall, the reader could be forgiven for losing sight of this point –
only to be reminded of it at the end by Apollo. Herodotus’ narrative
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83 ‘It skilfully lists different motifs of and reasons for Croesus’ fall. It also closes the cycle of
prediction and fulfilment stated at the beginning of the Croesus Logos with the Delphic sanction
of Gyges’ kingship’: Kindt (n. 7), 110. For Kindt, ‘The story of Croesus’ fall can . . . be read as a
“prophecy” of what we will find happening time and time again in the Histories. It is the story of
a ruler who, at the beginning of the logos, is at the peak of his power. Croesus, however, seems to
lack a sense of balance and proportion. Without a sound point of reference for his judgements he
gradually transgresses the limits of his power . . . Such hybris, Herodotus wants us to believe,
must necessarily result in failure.’ (114, 115).
84 Goldhill (n. 20), 25, notes in passing: ‘[N]ow the historian has the oracle reveal that on
the one hand the crime of Croesus’ ancestor demands expiation and, on the other, that Croesus’
own misinterpretation is the problem (as if Croesus could have avoided such expiation if he had
but asked a follow-up question).’ Pelling also raises this discrepancy – and what that might mean
for the reader – in his paper ‘Educating Croesus’ (forthcoming).
on Croesus’ test is not just about the failure of the king to get the
oracle right; it’s also a test of the reader’s reading ability.
In the final analysis the politics of polysemy is turned back on the
reader. We are invited to look at the episode beyond the narrow frame
of its specific occurrence and take into consideration both its begin-
ning and end – a perspective that we might now call ‘historical’.85
Furthermore, it is a perspective that is facilitated by possessing a
written text that can be read and re-read, and (re-)read in different
ways at different times . . . The over-determination of Croesus’ fall
pushes the reader to think about, and think with, how to enquire into
and interpret past events. In this way, the genre Herodotus creates can
play a critical role in helping to inform and shape the politics of the
wider (Greek) world.86
Conclusion: Operation reading for freedom
The oracle is notoriously polysemic. I offer two brief points for con-
sideration.
First, Herodotus’ location of the oracle at the heart of his first logos
affords an opportunity to explore the limitations of human authority,
notably of the powerful Eastern king. The despot, acting by himself
for himself, fails to comprehend the potential for polysemy. But there
is little sense of triumphalism or superiority.87 Readers are not only
confronted by the different approaches to receiving oracles; they are
also invited to reflect on what lies as the root causes of those differ-
ences. The Spartans appear capable of responding to oracular
ambiguity because of their constitutional arrangement. Later on, in
real and narrative time, the importance of an institutional framework
for interpretation is made explicit when Herodotus has the Athenians
literally bring the oracle back to discuss in their assembly and make
the correct interpretation (in spite of what the official oracle inter-
preters say) because of debate.
But this is only half the story. Second, and following on from this,
the ways in which Herodotus represents Croesus’ oracular consulta-
tions reproduce the testing for, and turn the enquiry back on to, the
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85 Looking to the end: Greenwood and Cartledge (n. 15), 351. The classic statement is in
Herodotus’ narrative itself, Solon’s advice to Croesus (1.32.9).
86 ‘No figure is more significant than Herodotus in this development of Greek self-represen-
tation’: Goldhill (n. 20), 16.
87 Not enough anyway to satisfy Plutarch: de Malignitate, Mor. 856c.
reader. By appropriating the Panhellenic institution (and authority) of
the Delphic oracle, Herodotus sets up his narrative in competition
with the public institutions that structure debate and enable
communal involvement in the polis. Herodotus then not only allows
us an insight into the failure of the all powerful individual when
confronted by the polysemic divine word; we are invited to perform
that superiority over the king and enact our difference as independent
citizens by reading.
Croesus’ testing of the oracle is therefore performative: readers may
also face (up to) the oracle’s ambiguity and, by testing it, understand
and enact their difference from all despots and despotic regimes,
eastern or otherwise . . . In this self-conscious resistance to authority,
including – or especially – that of Herodotus himself, even reading
can be an activity associated with performing as an independent
free-thinking citizen. By seeing reading as a separate exercise from
making political judgement, by emptying history of the struggle of
enquiry, by surrendering responsibility for judgement to an Author,
we risk losing that liberty we so cherish.88
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88 I have enjoyed many oracular consultations with friends and colleagues, above all Eliza-
beth Irwin, Julia Kindt, Kyriaki Konstantinidou, Robin Osborne, Christopher Pelling, and Rob
Tordoff; mistaken responses are my own. I am indebted to Roger Brock, who first displayed the
wonders of Herodotus’ enquiry to me, and David Hahm, with whom I first experienced the
pleasure of reading Herodotus in Greek.
